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PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE
ABU SAYYAF ATTACKS AND THE BALI BOMBING
Sarah E. Tilstra
t
Abstract: In May 2001, three Americans were kidnapped and held hostage by
members of Abu Sayyaf, a guerilla group attempting to establish an Islamic state in the
southern Philippines. Two of those Americans were later killed. In October 2002, a
nightclub on the Indonesian resort island of Bali was destroyed in an explosion, killing
over 200 people, 88 of whom were Australians. Members of the Islamic group Jemaah
Islamiyah are suspected of masterminding the attack. The Abu Sayyaf suspects have yet
to be caught, but Indonesia is preparing to prosecute some of the Bali bombing suspects
beginning in May 2003.
Using these two attacks as illustrations, this Comment explores the various options
available for prosecution of individuals suspected of committing terrorist attacks:
extradition, home prosecution, abduction or seizure, United Nations sanctions, the
International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court. The viability of each
option with respect to international terrorism situations depends on certain factors
weighing in favor and against the use of each option. These factors create a multi-step
balancing test to determine the best method of prosecution for suspects in future, similar
attacks. The balancing test is then applied to the Abu Sayyaf and Bali situations.
This Comment concludes that in situations similar to the Abu Sayyaf attacks, home
prosecution is best for several reasons: the relationship between the countries involved,
the relative strength of the Philippine judiciary, and the relatively low global interest in
the crime. However, the best forum for prosecution of suspects involved in attacks
similar to the Bali bombing is the International Criminal Court. This conclusion is based
on the high level of international interest, the apparent instability of the Indonesian justice
system, and the fact that the attacks are systematically directed towards a specific group
of people.
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2001, members of Abu Sayyaf, an Islamic group fighting to
establish an Islamic state on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao,'
kidnapped seventeen Filipinos and three Americans from a resort in the
Philippines. 2  One of the Americans, Guillermo Sobero, was beheaded by
Abu Sayyaf members in June 2001.3 The other two Americans, missionaries
t J.D., expected 2004. The author wishes to thank Professor Joan Fitzpatrick and the Editorial Staff
of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their valuable assistance.
The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), at
http://www.ict.org.il/inter-ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=3 (last visited Apr. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Policy Institute
for Counter-Terrorism].
2 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, 88 (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/i 0319.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2003) [hereinafter PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM].
3 Guerillas Confirm Death, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), June 27, 2001, at 41, available at LEXIS,
News and Business, Major World Publications File.
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Martin and Gracia Burnham, were held hostage until June 2002, when
Martin Burnham and others were killed in a military rescue operation. Only
Gracia Burnham survived.5
On October 12, 2002, a nightclub on the Indonesian island of Bali was
destroyed by a bomb, killing 202 people, 88 of whom were Australians.6
Jemaah Islamiyah, an Indonesian Islamist movement fighting to establish an
Islamic state encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the
southern Philippines, 7 is suspected of planning and executing the attack.8
Since September 11, 2001, the United States and other western
countries have strengthened security at home. 9 However, as these two
attacks indicate, citizens of western countries are also in danger of attacks
leveled against them, and western interests,' 0 abroad. In the last several
years, there have been many such attacks on western interests, making these
attacks equally worthy of attention.'"
Terrorist attacks like these present jurisdictional issues regarding
where and by whom suspects should be tried. The suspects are nationals of
the states where the attacks occurred,' 2 but the victims of the attacks are
4 For a newspaper article describing the event, see Richard C. Paddock & Al Jacinto, U.S. Hostage
Dies in Shootout" Philippine Troops Rescue Wife from Rebels, Cmii. TRIB., June 8, 2002, at 1, available at
LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
5 Id.
6 Darren Goodsir, Bali Suspects May Face Separate Trials, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 24,
2003, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
7 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 122.
8 See, e.g., Jakarta Arrests 'Singapore J! Head,' CNN ONLINE, Feb. 4, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WOPRLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/03/indonesia.singapore/index.htm.
On December 14, 2001, the United Kingdom enacted the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24 (Eng.), available at
http://www.hnso.gov.uk/acts/acts200l/20010024.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003). The explanatory notes
from the act indicate that it was passed in light of the events of September 11, 2001. Explanatory Notes to
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24 (Eng.) (prepared Feb. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en/2001en24.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003). Australia introduced a
package of counter-terrorism legislation in March 2002, including the Security Legislation Amendment
(Terrorism) Act 2002, No. 65, available at http://scaletext.law.gov.au/html/comact/l 1/6499/top.htm (last
visited Apr. 29, 2003).
" "Western interests" is used to mean westerners themselves, buildings or other fixtures built by or
for westerners, places westerners tend to frequent, etc. Attacks on western interests can occur when
westerners are the intended victims, regardless of whether they were the actual victims of the attack.
11 Some examples of these attacks include: the al-Qaida attacks on the US.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000
and on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's
kidnapping of four U.S. citizens in 2000; the Revolutionary Organization 17 November's murder of a
British official in 2000; the Revolutionary Nuclei's three bombings of U.S. interests in Greece in 1999 and
2000; the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front attempted attack on a U.S. consulate in Turkey;
the AI-Jihad attempted attack on the U.S. embassy in Albania in 1998; and the AI-Gama'a al-lslamiyya
killings of fifty-eight foreign tourists in Egypt in 1997. See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note
2, at app. B.
Although some of the suspects of the Bali bombing are Malaysian, this Comment focuses solely
on the Indonesian suspects.
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individuals of another nationality. In these cases, more than one state has an
interest in seeing suspects of such attacks brought to justice. Several
different options are available for resolving potential conflicts: extradition,
home prosecution,' 3 abduction or seizure, United Nations ("UN") sanctions,
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), or the International Criminal Court
("ICC").
This Comment uses the Abu Sayyaf and Bali attacks as vehicles to
examine the alternatives for prosecuting suspects of terrorist attacks who
have victimized nationals of another state on the suspects' home soil.
Although the attacks have some similarities, there are significant differences
between their circumstances and the relationships between the various
countries involved. It is these differences that make such an analysis useful.
Using these two attacks to assess the benefits and drawbacks of using each
prosecution method yields some essential factors that must be considered.
These factors include: strength and independence of the home country's
judiciary, global interest in the crime, the relationship between the countries
involved, the interest of the requesting state, and the nature of the crime.
These factors help articulate a test for determining under what circumstances
different prosecution options should be applied to future attacks. This
Comment concludes that home prosecution is the best option for attacks
similar to the Abu Sayyaf attacks, while prosecution in the ICC is preferable
for attacks similar to the Bali bombing.
Part II of this Comment gives a background of Abu Sayyaf and
Jemaah Islamiyah, outlining the recent attacks and explaining why these two
examples of international terrorism are useful to illustrate prospective
options for prosecution. After briefly summarizing relevant extradition law,
Part III examines the application of extradition to the two situations, and
explores situations in which extradition would be a viable and desirable
option. Part IV examines the option of home prosecution and assesses the
factors that make home prosecution desirable. Part V examines abduction or
seizure of the terrorist by the western country as a possible alternative and
explores the desirability of choosing this route. Part VI looks at the
possibility of intervention and/or trial by an independent body as a solution.
Specifically, it addresses UN sanctions, the ICJ, and the ICC as possible
options, and discusses when those options would be desirable. Part VII
articulates a multi-factor test for analyzing how to prosecute suspects of
similar crimes, and Part VIII applies that test to the Abu Sayyaf and Bali
13 Home prosecution occurs when a suspect is prosecuted in his home country, the place of the
attacks.
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situations. Application of this test to the Abu Sayyaf and Bali situations
shows that home prosecution is the best option for attacks similar to the Abu
Sayyaf attacks, while prosecution in the ICC is preferable for attacks similar
to the Bali bombing.
II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND Two RECENT ATTACKS
In order to properly frame the recent Abu Sayyaf and Bali attacks, it is
necessary to define international terrorism. Such a definition is problematic
because the term is broad and imprecise,1 4 leading to the clich6 "one man's
terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."' 15  The United States Code
attempts to define international terrorism. Furthermore, the two recent
attacks by Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah represent examples.
A. International Terrorism
The United States Code defines international terrorism as:
activities that - (1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life ... ; (2) appear to be intended - (A) to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; (B) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (C) to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States .... 16
Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah are groups that fit into this
definition. They represent examples of international terrorism where
independent, usually religious, groups are targeting western interests in the
group's home country.' 7 As a result of these attacks, September 11, and
other recent terrorist acts of a similar nature, international concern,
particularly in western countries, is piqued. Because of this heightened
concern, an exploration of the prosecutorial options in the Abu Sayyaf and
Jemaah Islamiyah attacks is a useful exercise for potential future application.
4 See Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisprudential and Definitional
Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 239-40 (1995).
s Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism: The Other World War, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CONTROLS 29 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1990).
" 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2003).
17 See supra note 11.
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B. The Abu Sayyaf Attack
Abu Sayyaf is the most violent of the Islamic separatist groups in the
southern Philippines.' 8 This group, whose name means "bearer of the
sword" in Arabic,' 9 is involved in kidnapping for ransom, bombings,
assassinations, and extortion,20 and has been linked with al-Qaida .2  The
group mainly operates in the southern Philippines, but has also kidnapped
individuals from Malaysia.22 Abu Sayyaf has been committing terrorist
attacks since 1991,23 including an attack on a Christian town in 1995 that left
fifty-three dead,2 4 and two separate kidnappings in 2000 of over twenty-five
individuals.2 5  The U.S. Department of State has questioned Abu Sayyaf's
secessionist motives, claiming that the group seems to be using terrorism
primarily for financial gain.26 The State Department has also noted that the
27group appears to be mainly self-supporting through ransom and extortion.
Abu Sayyaf is made up of several hundred core members, but allegedly over
1000 individuals joined the group in 2000-01, motivated by the opportunity
28to receive ransom money.
The fact that some of the victims of the May 2001 Abu Sayyaf attack
were U.S. citizens caused the U.S. government to take action. On July 23,
2002, soon after the rescue attempt, the U.S. Department of Justice issued an
'8 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 88. The group split from a larger Islamic
separatist group, the Moro National Liberation Front (also called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or
"MILF") in the early 1990s. Id. MILF has also been active in attacks in the Philippines recently. See, e.g.,
Friena P. Guerrero & Carmelito Q. Francisco, Fears Over 'State of Lawlessness' Declaration Allayed,
BUSINESSWORLD, Apr. 4, 2003, at 12, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications
File (stating that police suspect MILF's involvement in a recent bomb attack).
19 Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions & Answers-Abu Sayyaf Group,
http://www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/abusayyaf.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Council
on Foreign Relations-Abu Sayyafl.
21 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 88.
21 See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations-Abu Sayyaf, supra note 19.
21 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 88.
23 See Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, supra note 1.
24 Id.
2' See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 88. Abu Sayyaf is also believed
responsible for the series of bombings in the Christian town of Zamboanga in October 2002 that killed
twelve people total, including a U.S. Green Beret. Philippine Suspects Caught Building Bomb, CNN
ONLINE, Oct. 23, 2002,
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/23/philippine.blast/index.htm. The group has
also claimed responsibility for the Davao airport blast on March 4, 2003 that killed over twenty people,
including an American missionary. Bruce Cheesman, US Troops More Likely in Philippines, AUSTRALIAN
FIN. REV., Mar. 6, 2003, at 12, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
" PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 88.
27 Id. See also Richard C. Paddock, Rebel Groups Could Unite Against U.S.; Philippine Insurgents
Say a Deployment of American Combat Troops Against the Abu Sayyaf Could Unleash a Wider Conflict,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at 5, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
" PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 88.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
indictment charging five leaders of Abu Sayyaf with conspiracy resulting in
death, hostage-taking, and three counts of hostage-taking resulting in
death.29 To date, none of the five men charged has been apprehended,
although one of the men, Aldam Tilao, the group's spokesperson, was
believed killed in a military encounter in July 2002.30
C. The Bali Attack
Jemaah Islamiyah, whose name means "Islamic group" in
Indonesian,3 I has cells operating throughout southeast Asia.32 The stated
goal of the group is to create an Islamic state encompassing much of
southeast Asia.33 The number of Jemaah Islamiyah members is unknown,
but the Malaysian cells probably consist of about 200 members. 34 Captured
members have also revealed links with al-Qaida.35 In 1997, Jemaah
Islamiyah members began plans to target U.S. interests in Singapore,3 6 and
in 2001, Singapore officials captured fifteen Jemaah Islamiyah members
who had planned to attack U.S., Israeli, British, and Australian diplomatic
buildings in Singapore. 37 Jemaah Islamiyah members were also responsible
for the Christmas Eve bombings of 2000, which targeted churches and
priests in Indonesia, killing nineteen people.3t Up until the Bali attack,
Jemaah Islamiyah mainly targeted Indonesian Christians, as revenge for the
massacre of Muslims by Christians in some areas of the country in 1999 and
2000.3 9 Commentators have noted that the Bali attack may be indicative of a
29 Press Release No. 419, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Five Leaders of the Abu Sayyaf Group Indicted for
Hostage-Taking of Americans and Others in the Philippines (July 23, 2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/July/02 crm 419.htm. A Philippine nurse was also killed in the rescue
operation. Id. The crime of conspiracy is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2003), and the crime of hostage-
taking is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2003).
0 Philippines. Third Bomb Explodes in Central Mindanao, BBC MONITORING ASIA PAC.-POL.,
Feb. 22, 2003, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
31 Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions and Answers-Jemaah lslamiyah,
http://www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/jemaah.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
32 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 122.
"3 Federation of American Scientists-Intelligence Resource Program, Jemaah lslamiya (W),
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ji.htm (updated Dec. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Federation of American
Scientists].
" PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 123.
35 Id. at 122; THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: HOW THE JEMAAH
ISLAMIYAH TERRORIST NETWORK OPERATES 1 (2002), available at http://www.intl-crisis-
group.org/projects/asia/indonesia/reports/A400845_11 122002.pdf (Dec. 11, 2002) [hereinafter INDONESIA
BACKGROUNDER].
16 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 123.
37 id.
38 INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER, supra note 35, at 5.
39 Id. at i-ii.
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shift in Jemaah Islamiyah's attention away from Indonesian Christians and
towards westerners, in response to the war on terror spearheaded by the
United States.
40
After the attack, both Australia and Indonesia attempted to respond.
In November 2002, Australia passed a bill in Parliament to make it easier for
foreigners suspected of killing Australians abroad to be extradited to
Australia for trial. 4' However, to date Australia has not requested any
extraditions. Australia and Indonesia successfully cooperated in the
investigation into the Bali bombings, 42 and as of late April 2003, twenty-
nine Indonesian Bali bombing suspects had been captured.43 The first trials
for the suspects in custody will likely begin in May 2003 in Bali.4
4
The two attacks at issue here, as well as the perpetrating groups, have
critical similarities and differences. The Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah
situations are similar in that both groups are Islamic separatists, using
violence to try to establish a separate Muslim state in their respective areas. 5
Both groups have a history of targeting Christian nationals of their
respective countries.46 Both groups have also targeted foreigners as victims
of their attacks.47 However, the reasons foreigners are targeted differ
between the two groups. Abu Sayyaf appears to target foreigners primarily
for the purposes of ransom money 4 -individuals from western countries are
likely to be wealthier and therefore better targets for kidnapping. However,
Jemaah Islamiyah targeted westerners in Bali specifically because they were
western9-it was the symbolic nature of attacking westerners that was
40 Id. at ii.
4' Bills Digest No. 67 2002-03, Criminal Code Amendment (Offences Against Australians) Bill
2002, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2002-03/03bdO67.htm (last reviewed Nov. 26,
2002) [hereinafter Australian Bills Digest].
42 See, e.g., Andrew Burrell, Australia Beefs Up Mission to Jakarta, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Mar. 3,
2003, at 9, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
4' Tony Emmanuel, Three Malaysian JI Suspects Nabbed by Indon Police, NEW STRAITS TIMES
(Malaysia), Apr. 24, 2003, at 1, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
" See Wa ,'ne Miller, Bali BombcrS Brief Handed to Cour, AGE (Melboume), May 1, 2003, at 7,
available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
45 Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, supra note 1; Federation of American Scientists, supra
note 33.
46 See Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, supra note I (discussing Abu Sayyaf targets, including
a bookstore staffed by Christian preachers, Catholic churches, a cathedral, nuns, a priest, and the Christian
town of Zamboanga); INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER, supra note 35, at i-ii.
41 The two specific attacks being examined in this Comment are examples.
" PATTERNS OF GI.OBALTERRORISM, supra note 2, at 88.
49 One of the suspects stated that the purpose of the bombing was to attack America and its allies.
See, e.g., Bali Bomb Suspect Apologizes, CNN ONLINE, Feb. 11, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/02/ l1/bali.suspect/index.htrrl.
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significant.50 These similarities and differences guide the ensuing analysis,
which uses these two situations as illustrations of how suspects of
international terrorism can and should be tried. The prosecutorial techniques
explored are extradition, home prosecution, abduction or seizure, UN
sanctions, the ICJ, and the ICC.
III. EXTRADITION
Extradition is a process achieved mainly through treaty, and in
accordance with the terms of the treaty. The extradition laws of the
countries involved also dictate how and when extradition is achieved. In the
Abu Sayyaf situation, extradition is an option because the terms of the
United States-Philippines extradition treaty provide for it. In the Bali
bombing situation, extradition is not an option, because Indonesia's own law
prohibits the extradition of nationals. The terms of the relevant treaty and
the interest of the requesting state are factors that point to the viability and
desirability of extradition as an option.
A. Extradition Defined
Extradition is the official surrender of an alleged criminal (regardless
of his consent) by the state where he is located to another state for either
criminal prosecution or execution of a sentence in the latter state.5'
Extradition by virtue of a treaty is the most common practice between
states.52 In fact, in the absence of a treaty, no customary international duty
to extradite exists.
53
50 See, e.g., Bali Bomb Suspect 'Admits' Militant Ties, CNN ONLINE, Nov. 8, 2002,
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/11/08/bali.bombings/ (including discussion of
Jemaah Islamiyah meeting regarding the types of targets to attack); Paul Burton, Behind the Bali Bombing,
Oct. 16, 2002, http://www.janes.com/security/intemationalsecurity/news/sentinel/sent021016_l n.shtml
(including discussion of the symbolism of Bali as a target); Kara Lawrence & Damon Johnston, Agent of
Evil Behind the Atrocity-The Main Suspect in Bali Bombing-Hunt for the Killers, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Oct. 16, 2002, at 6, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World
Publications File (stating that the Bali bombing was a symbolic attack against the West).
51 Donna E. Arzt, The Lockerbie "Extradition by Analogy" Agreement: "Exceptional Measure" or
Template for Transnational Criminal Justice?, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 163, 172 (2002).
" M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 36
(4th ed. 2002).
53 Arzt, supra note 51, at 173. One commentator has noted that most states view the duty to
extradite as arising from a treaty. BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 47.
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Extradition has four substantive requirements: dual criminality,
extraditable offenses, specialty, and non-inquiry.54  First, dual criminality
indicates that the offense for which the individual is being extradited must
be a crime in both the requesting and the requested state.55  Second,
extraditable offenses are those offenses that have been deemed subject to
extradition-these are generally listed in the treaty itself.56 Third, specialty
means that the requesting state can only prosecute the extradited individual
for the crime for which he was extradited, or else obtain the permission of
the requested state to prosecute on other charges. 57 Finally, the doctrine of
non-inquiry gives deference to the sovereignty of the requesting state, and
prohibits other states from judging its legal system.58
In addition to substantive requirements, there are a number of
common conditions states place on extradition. Many states, in both their
own statutes and their extradition treaties, limit extradition to those offenses
committed within the territory of the requesting state.59 Crimes committed
outside the requesting state that are intended to result, and do result in
negative effects within that state also fall within this traditional
understanding of extradition. 60  Extradition can also often be refused if
authorities in the requested state have opted not to proceed against the
individual in question,61 or if prosecution is pending against that
individual .62
Apart from the substantive requirements of extradition, some scholars
have stated that non-extradition of nationals is a widely-accepted principle
under international law.6 3 If a state opts to refuse extradition on this ground,
54 BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 463. This Comment will not discuss the procedural requirements for
extradition.
" Id. at 466.
56 Id. A recent trend has replaced listing of extraditable offenses with the requirement that the
offense be punishable by at least one year of imprisonment. Id. at 481.
7 Id. at 511.
SId. at 569.
59 SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 63 (1963).
60 id.
" See, e.g., Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, United Nations Office for Drug Control
and Crime Prevention, 68th plenary mtg., art. 4(b), (1990), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r116.htm [hereinafter Model Treaty on Extradition].
62 See id. art. 4(c).
63 Christopher C. Joyner & Wayne P. Rothbaum, Libya and the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie: What
Lessons for International Extradition Law?, 14 MICH. J. INT'L LAW 222, 242 (1993). Many Pacific Rim
countries have a provision allowing for the refusal of extradition of nationals in their bilateral extradition
treaties. E.g., The Extradition Treaty Between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of
Indonesia, art. 6 (date unknown), http://www.chanrobles.com/rpindonesiaextraditiontreaty.htm (last visited
Apr. 29, 2003); The Treaty on Extradition Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of South
Korea, 2000, art. 7, http://www.deplu.go.id/world/bilateral/asia/ekskoren-30novOO.htm (last visited Apr.
29, 2003); The Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Australia, May 14, 1974,
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the principle of aut dedere autjudicare often comes into play. Aut dedere
autjudicare refers to the obligation either to extradite or prosecute.6 4 The
obligation requires a state that holds someone who has committed a crime of
international concern either to extradite the suspect to another state that can
try him or else prosecute the suspect in its own courts.65 This concept is
incorporated into some extradition treaties, and mainly exists in response to
the fact that many states will not extradite their own citizens.66 In addition,
at least one commentator has stated that aut dedere aut judicare is a
customary international norm.67
States may also be able to refuse extradition if the offense was
committed outside the territory of either state and "the law of the requested
state does not provide for jurisdiction over such an offense committed
,,68
outside its territory in comparable circumstances. The UN has recognized
that this is because "most States would not wish to extradite for an offence
where the other State had asserted a ground of extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction that is clearly excessive under generally accepted standards of
international law.",
6 9
B. Applicability of Extradition to the Abu Sayyaf Situation
Under the terms of the United States-Philippines Extradition Treaty, it
is possible that the Abu Sayyaf suspects, if caught, could be extradited to the
United States. The suspects could also be extradited under the terms of the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 70 Extradition is a
possibility in this situation because of the terms of these two treaties.
1974 U.S.T. LEXIS 130, art. 5, available at http://www.usextradition.com/australia bi.htm; Treaty on
Extradition Between Australia and the Republic of the Philippines, Jan. 18, 1991, Australian Treaty Series
1991, No. 5, art. 4(2)(a), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/other/dfat/treaties/1991/5.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
6" M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1995).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 11.
67 Id. at 22.
68 Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 61, art. 4(e).
" UNITED NATIONS, MANUAL ON THE MODEL TREATY ON EXTRADITION AND MANUAL ON THE
MODEL TREATY ON MUTUAL CRIMINAL ASSISTANCE: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, Manual on the Model
Treaty on Extradition, at 10., U.N. Sales No. E.96-IV-2 (1995).
G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. No. A/34/46 (1979),
available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv5.pdf [hereinafter Hostages Treaty] (discussed
infra Part III.B.2).
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1. The United States-Philippines Treaty and Philippine Extradition Law
The extradition treaty between the Philippines and the United States
provides that the countries agree to extradite individuals whom the
requesting state has charged or convicted of an extraditable offense.7' If the
offense was committed outside the requesting state, there are two
circumstances under which extradition shall be granted:
(a) if the laws of the Requested State provide for punishment of
an offense committed outside its territory in similar
circumstances; or (b) if the executive authority of the Requested
State, in its discretion, decides to submit the case to its courts
for the purpose of extradition.7 2
The treaty prohibits extradition "when the person sought has been
tried and convicted or acquitted in the Requested State for the offense for
which extradition is requested., 73 The treaty does not preclude extradition if
the authorities in the requested state have decided to discontinue criminal
proceedings against the individual in question.74 Also, there is no provision
allowing the requested state to refuse extradition if the offense was
committed within its own territory. Finally, extradition cannot be refused on
the ground that the requested individual is a national of the requested state.75
The Philippines also has its own extradition law that governs the
procedure for extraditing individuals to other countries.76 This law states
that if the government receives an extradition request from a country with
which it has an extradition treaty, the Secretary of Justice must refer the
request to a Philippine court that has jurisdiction over the matter.77 The
court must then either grant the request for extradition, or dismiss the
petition.
7 8
71 Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, Nov. 13, 1994, art. 1, 1994 U.S.T. LEXIS 185, available at
http://www.usextradition.com/phil-bi.htm [hereinafter U.S.-Philippines Treaty]. The treaty was signed on
November 13, 1994, and entered into force on Nov. 22, 1996. Id.
72 Id. art. 2(4)(a)-(b).
7' Id. art. 5(1).
74 Id. art. 5(2).
" Id. art. 6.
76 Philippine Extradition Law, Presidential Decree No. 1069 (1977),
http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecreeno1069.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
77 Id. § 5.
71 Id. § 10.
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2. The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, to
which both the Philippines and the United States are parties, has 39
signatories and 118 parties.79 The convention's provisions cover seizures or
attempts at seizure and detainment of individuals with the threat to kill,
injure, or further detain them unless a third party acts or abstains from acting
in a particular way.80 Participation as an accomplice is also covered by the
convention.
8 1
Because Abu Sayyaf members took American hostages in the 2001
incident, this convention is applicable. Under the convention, a state can
establish jurisdiction over hostage-takers if the act is committed in its
territory,82 or by any of its nationals. 83 A state can also establish jurisdiction
if the act was done to compel that state to act or abstain from acting,8 4 and if
a hostage is a national of that state.85 If an offender is present in a state
party's territory and that state will not extradite him, the state must prosecute
the offender. 6 The offenses listed in the convention are also considered
extraditable offenses.
87
In the Abu Sayyaf situation, the convention does not add any new
basis for jurisdiction because it only gives the requested state the option to
extradite on its terms, subject to its own laws. 88 Therefore, if the Philippines
decided not to extradite the suspects, based on its own laws and precedent,
the convention does not provide any additional reasons to do so. It is
therefore unlikely that the convention would be invoked.
3. Extradition of the Abu Sayyaf Suspects Is a Possibility
The United States has not sent the Philippines government an
extradition request, perhaps because the indicted individuals have not been
caught. However, if they are caught and a request is sent, it is possible that
79 United Nations Treaty Collections, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages-
Status, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/Status/Chapter-xviii/treaty5.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2003). The
convention entered into force on June 3, 1983. Id.
80 Hostages Treaty, supra note 70, art. 1.
"' Id. art. l(2)(b).
12 Id. art. 5(l)(a).
3 Id. art. 5(l)(b).
' Id. art. 5(I)(e).
'5 Id. art. 5(l)(d).
:6 Id. art. 8(1).
87 Id. art. 10(1).
8' Id. art. 10(2)-(3).
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the suspects could be extradited to the United States. The acting Justice
Secretary of the Philippines has stated that under the treaty, the government
is bound to refer the extradition request to the proper court, 89 a statement that
accurately reflects Philippine extradition law.90 If a court decides that the
suspects should be extradited, then they could be sent to the United States.
It appears, then, that extradition could be a viable option for the Abu Sayyaf
attacks, or situations with similar circumstances.
Although other individuals have been extradited to the United States
from the Philippines, none of these cases is analogous to the Abu Sayyaf
situation, in terms of both the nationality of the suspect and the place of the
crime. In October 1997, a Philippine national wanted in the United States
for a murder he allegedly committed there was extradited to the United
States. 91 Later requests for extradition of individuals to the United States
also involved crimes committed in the United States.92 Because the crimes
at issue here were committed in the Philippines, by Filipinos, it is possible
that a Filipino court could decide not to extradite, although extradition in this
type of situation is allowed by the bilateral treaty.
93
C. Extradition Is an Unlikely Option for the Bali Bombing Suspects
Extradition is an extremely unlikely option for the Indonesian Bali
bombing suspects because of the narrow terms of the Indonesia-Australia
Extradition Treaty.94 The most significant provision of the treaty provides
that each state has the right to refuse extradition of its nationals. 95 However,
" U.S. Indicts Abu Sayyaf for Barbaric Acts, MANILA STANDARD, July 25, 2002, available at
LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
90 The Philippine law provides that Philippine courts have jurisdiction over matters concerning the
handling of extradition requests. Philippine Extradition Law, Presidential Decree No. 1069, §5 (1977),
http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecreeno1069.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
91 Scott Hadly, Oxnard Slaying Suspect Returned from Philippines, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at
B 1, available at LEXIS, News and Business, News, Major World Publications.
92 See, e.g., U.S. Seeks Extradition of a Philippine Presidential Adviser, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, June 17, 1999, available at LEXIS, News and Business, News, Major World Publications;
Jeffrey 0. Valisno et al., RP Sends Jimenez to United States, BUSINESSWORLD, Dec. 27, 2002, at 12,
available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File (Philippine Congressperson
extradited to United States on charges of fraud, tax evasion, and illegal campaign contributions to President
Clinton's 1996 bid for re-election).
13 See U.S.-Philippines Treaty, supra note 71, art. 6, which allows for the extradition of nationals.
94 Extradition Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia, Apr. 22, 1992, Australian
Treaty Series 1995 No. 7, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1995/7.htnl (last
visited Apr. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Indonesia-Australia Treaty]. The treaty was signed on April 22, 1992,
and entered into force on January 21, 1995. Id.
" Id. art. 5(1).
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a requested state must, if the requesting state asks, prosecute the suspects
itself if it refuses to extradite its nationals.
96
In addition, Indonesia also has its own extradition law that prohibits
extradition of nationals, except in certain circumstances. The law states that:
(1) A request for the extradition of a national of the Republic of
Indonesia shall be refused.
(2) A deviation from the provision of paragraph (1) mentioned
above may be made if in the view of the circumstances it would
be better if the person concerned be tried at the place of the
commission of the crime.97
Since the crime in question was committed in Indonesia, there is no
discretion for Indonesia to extradite any of its nationals. Australia has not
sent any extradition requests to Indonesia for any of the bombing suspects, 98
and it is unlikely that extradition will be an option for Indonesia or for
situations similar to the Bali bombing.
D. Factors Pointing to Extradition as the Best Option
Since no duty to extradite exists in the absence of a treaty,99 the
existence of a bilateral or multilateral treaty that addresses extradition is the
primary factor in considering whether extradition can and should be used as
a prosecution method. Many countries have bilateral extradition treaties,'00
and if the terms of the bilateral treaty allow for extradition of nationals of the
requested state, extradition may be an option. If no bilateral treaty exists,
states can use multilateral treaties, such as the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages' 0 1 or the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 0 2 if they are parties to these
9' Id. art. 5(2).
97 Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 1, art. 7(l)-(2) (1979) (Indon.), cited in Australian Bills
Digest, supra note 41.98 ..
This is probably because Australia recognizes that Indonesia's laws do not allow it to extradite any
of its own nationals. See Australian Bills Digest, supra note 41 (stating that "any Indonesian nationals
involved in the Bali bombings cannot be extradited and tried in Australia").
99 Arzt, supra note 51, at 173.
"0 It is estimated that there are approximately 1500 bilateral extradition treaties. Torsten Stein,
Extradition Treaties, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 336 (1992).
101 Hostages Treaty, supra note 70.
102 G.A. Res. A/RES/52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1997), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Convl I .pdf [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing Treaty].
VOL. 12 No. 3
PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
conventions. Both of these international conventions have provisions
requiring states to extradite or prosecute suspected offenders. 10 3  However,
these multilateral treaties allow states to extradite on their own terms,
subject to their own laws. 04 These treaties would therefore seem only to
help facilitate extradition in situations where there is no bilateral extradition
treaty and the offender is present in a party state that will not try him.
Therefore, whether the bilateral treaty and the home state's extradition laws
allow for the extradition of nationals is an essential factor.
Extradition in these types of situations should also require that the
requesting state have a greater interest in prosecuting the suspects than the
home state, 105 because it is universally accepted that a state can regulate acts
committed within its borders. 10 6  The balancing of interests between the
requesting state and the home state'0 7 will affect whether the extradition
request is granted or denied,'0 8 and is, therefore, a factor in determining
whether extradition is a preferable method of prosecution.
IV. HOME PROSECUTION
If individuals suspected of international terrorist acts are not
extradited to the victims' home country for prosecution, another option is
home prosecution. Home prosecution appears to be an option in the Abu
Sayyaf situation, and it is already being used in the Bali bombing case.
There are several major advantages to home prosecution over extradition in
these types of cases. The relationship between the two countries involved as
103 Hostages Treaty, supra note 70, art. 8(1); Terrorist Bombing Treaty, supra note 102, art. 8(1).
104 Hostages Treaty, supra note 70, art. 10(2)-(3); Terrorist Bombing Treaty, supra note 102, art.
9(2)-(3).
1o' At least one scholar has recognized that whether or not the home state's interest in the suspect is
greater than that of the requesting state is a factor in deciding whether to extradite. BASSIOUNI, supra note
52, at 313.
"o Id. at 314.
107 One way to determine a state's interest in prosecuting a suspect itself is to decide which theories
of international jurisdiction give it authority over that suspect, since those theories give rule-making and
rule-enforcing power. BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 315. In situations similar to the Abu Sayyaf and Bali
attacks, two theories of international jurisdiction can support extradition: passive personality jurisdiction
and protective jurisdiction. Passive personality jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the victim of the
crime, and protective jurisdiction (also called the "effects principle") is based on the national interest
affected by a crime. For a discussion of these two types of jurisdiction, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402, cmts. d & g (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT];
BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 370-77. When a state can assert these bases of jurisdiction, as the United
States and Australia can here, the theories can lend support to a request for extradition, as they indicate the
state's interest in the suspect. However, in these two examples, the Philippines and Indonesia can also
claim passive personality and protective jurisdiction, since Philippine and Indonesian nationals were killed
in the attacks, and because there is a national interest in stopping separatist groups.108 BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 313.
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well as the strength of the home state's judiciary are factors to examine in
determining whether home prosecution is the best option.
A. Home Prosecution Defined
Home prosecution occurs when the suspects are tried in the country
where they are nationals, and where the attack occurred.
B. Home Prosecution Is Possible in the Abu Sayyaf Situation
The Philippine government appears to be ready and willing to
prosecute the Abu Sayyaf suspects if they are caught.10 9 The government
has previously prosecuted Abu Sayyaf suspects charged with similar
crimes.'10 The Philippine judicial system is similar in some respects to the
judicial branch of the United States,"' and has been recognized by the U.S.
State Department as independent.'1 2  However, the State Department has
also said the Philippine judiciary is inefficient and corrupt, 1 3 which could
indicate that the United States is uncomfortable with the prospect of Abu
Sayyaf suspects being tried in the Philippines. Howexer, this discomfort
109 See, e.g., U.S. Indicts Abu Sayyaffor Barbaric Acts, supra note 89; Felipe F. Salvosa II et al., U.S.
Issues Indictments vs. Abu Sayyaf Leaders, BUSINESSWORLD, July 25, 2002, at 12, available at LEXIS,
News and Business, Major World Publications File.
1o See, e.g., Court to Expedite Trial of Captured ASG Chief BUSINESSWORLD, Apr. 9, 2002, at 11,
available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File (discussing a trial of an Abu
Sayyaf leader charged with kidnapping); Juvenile Court for 75 Abu Suspects, MANILA STANDARD, May 31,
2002, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File (discussing plans to move
some Abu Sayyaf suspects to juvenile court).
.. There are lower municipal and city courts, regional trial courts, a Court of Appeals, and a Supreme
Court, as well as several special courts. See The Philippine Court System,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/hierarchy.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003). The Philippines' system of
government is a representative democracy, modeled after the United States. Philippines. Constitution,
Government & Legislation, Jurist, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/philippines.htm (last visited Apr. 29,
2003).
112 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001, PHILIPPINES (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8371.htm (Mar. 4, 2002) [hereinafter PHILIPPINES HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT]. The nonprofit group Freedom House, which rates countries based on political rights and
civil liberties, has also given the Philippines a rating of "free" in their most recent survey in 2001-02.
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES, 2001-2002 (2002), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/philippines.htm (last updated July
15, 2002) [hereinafter FREEDOM HOUSE-PHILIPPINES REPORT].113 PHILIPPINES HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 112.
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may be alleviated by the continued involvement of U.S. troops in the
Philippines in a training role.'"
4
C. Home Prosecution is Occurring in the Bali Bombing Situation
The Indonesian government has already captured some of the Bali
bombing suspects and will begin trying them in May 2003.' '5 Indonesia has
complied with the Indonesia-Australia Extradition Treaty requirement of aut
dedere aut judicare" 16 by indicating that it will try the suspects within its
territory.
However, there are some potential problems with home prosecution in
the Bali bombing situation. Indonesia's legal system has been recognized by
many as corrupt 17 and subordinated by the executive branch." 8 One recent
example of this is the prosecution of Indonesian officers accused of human
rights violations during East Timor's independence struggle in 1999.'19 In
2000, the UN Security Council agreed to postpone international inquiry into
these crimes to allow Indonesia to prosecute the alleged offenders. 2 ° The
Indonesian government created the Indonesian Human Rights Tribunal,
14 Joint exercises have been planned involving the Philippine army and U.S. forces in the
Philippines. See Felipe F. Salvosa II, Discussion on Balikatan Shifts to 'Semantics,' BUSiNESSWORLD,
Apr. 14, 2003, at 12, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File. In addition,
the U.S. government has also stated that it considers the Philippines a partner in the war on terror, and that
it plans to aid the Philippines in eradicating terrorism there, suggesting an acceptance of a purely assisting
role. See Mercedes Tira Andrei, Bush Gov't Offers to Help Blast Victims Seek Justice, BUSINESSWORLD,
Mar. 6, 2003, at 11, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
iS Miller, supra note 44.
116 Indonesia-Australia Treaty, supra note 94, art. 5(2).
117 See, e.g., Jared Levinson, Indonesia's Odyssey: A Nation's Long, Perilous Journey to the Rule of
Law and Democracy, 18 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 103, 114-15 (2001); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 2001, INDONESIA (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/831 4 .htm (Mar. 4,
2002) [hereinafter INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; Stuart J. Barnett, Death Carries a Risk, COURIER
MAIL, Mar. 4, 2003, at 11, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File. In
addition, Freedom House has only given Indonesia a rating of "partly free." FREEDOM HOUSE, PREEDOM IN
THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGIHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2001-2002 (2002),
available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/indonesia.htm (last
updated July 25, 2002).
"a INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 117.
"9 For an overview of the problems relating to these prosecutions, see Ellen Nakashima, Rights
Groups Fault Indonesian Tribunal; Most Acquitted So Far for East Timor Atrocities; Higher-Ups Avoid
Prosecution, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at A16, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World
Publications File.
120 See Ian Martin, No Justice in Jakarta, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2002, at A15, available at LEXIS,
News and Business, Major World Publications File.
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which is trying eighteen suspects with charges of human rights abuses. 12 1
As of January 7, 2003, the tribunal had dismissed charges against ten of the
officers for lack of evidence, 122 even though UN investigators and an
Indonesian human rights commission found that the violence in East Timor
had been planned and supported by the Indonesian military. 123  Only two
officers have been convicted to date. 124 International groups have criticized
the rulings of the tribunal and described the court as "a sham."'
125
Although the East Timor prosecutions and the Bali bombing
prosecutions are not necessarily analogous, the East Timor situation does
demonstrate international discomfort with the Indonesian justice system.
The Indonesian government has pursued prosecution of the Bali bombing
suspects intensely, 126 which may assuage worries that the suspects will be
treated similar to the East Timor officers. However, the lengthening delays
of the trials and the torture claims of some suspects raise questions about the
Bali proceedings. 27  Although the Indonesian government is pursuing
prosecution intensely, it does not necessarily follow that home state
prosecution is the ideal solution for situations similar to the Bali bombing.
D. Advantages of Home Prosecution and Factors Pointing to Home
Prosecution as the Best Option
A primary advantage to home prosecution in situations similar to the
Abu Sayyaf and Bali bombing situations is that evidence and witnesses
necessary to effectively try the case will most likely be found in the
"2 See Indonesian Court Jails Officer for 5 Years in Timor Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at
A7, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File [hereinafter Indonesian
Court].
122 See James Dunn, Crimes in East Timor Unpunished James Dunn Decries the Failure of an
Indonesian Tribunal to Convict Those Responsible for Murder and Destruction, CANBERRA TIMES, Jan. 7,
2003, at A 11, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
23 See Indonesian Court, supra note 121.
124 In December 2002 Lt. Col. Soedjarwo received a five-year sentence, after prosecutors had asked
for ten years. See Indonesian Court, supra note 121. In March 2003, Brig. Gen. Noer Muis received a
five-year sentence for failing to prevent two massacres. General Guilty Over Timor Killings, CNN
ONLINE, Mar. 12, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/03/12/timor.general/index.html.
'2' See Army Colonel Sentenced Over East Timor Killings, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 28, 2002, at
9, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File ("International rights groups
have strongly criticised the previous acquittals and described the Indonesian court as a sham.").
16 At least one of the bombers, if convicted, may face the death penalty. I Was Only Guilty of
Shopping, Says Bali Accused, THE ADVERTISER, Mar. 8, 2003, at 60, available at LEXIS, News and
Business, Major World Publications File.
127 Darren Goodsir, Evidence for the Prosecution, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 1, 2003, at 37,
available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
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countries where the crime was committed.128 When suspects are extradited
to the requesting state or tried by an independent body in another location,
gathering of evidence and bringing forth witnesses is more time-consuming,
inefficient, and costly.
29
The international recognition that each state can regulate conduct
within its borders13 is also an advantage to home prosecution in these types
of situations. This concept is called the territorial principle.' 3 ' Although
less widely recognized than the territorial principle,' 32 the theory of active
personality/nationality jurisdiction, which is based on the nationality of the
accused, 133 also supports home prosecution in these types of situations.'
34
While the location of evidence and the place of commission of the
crime are advantages pointing towards home prosecution that will exist in
every attack similar to the Abu Sayyaf and Bali attacks, there are also factors
that may or may not be present that will bear on whether home prosecution
is a good option. One of these factors is the requesting state's confidence in
the ability and methods of the home state regarding prosecution of the
suspects. Home prosecution will be indicated in situations where the state
whose nationals were the primary targets has confidence in the consistency
and competency of the home state's judicial system. However, home
prosecution will not be indicated if the requesting state has reason to believe
that the suspects will not receive a fair trial, perhaps due to the non-
independence of that country's judiciary, political connections the suspect
may have, or other factors that may allow the suspect to evade justice. 135
12s See, e.g., BEDI, supra note 59, at 97 (stating that common law countries generally allow for the
extradition of nationals to the country where the crime was committed, since they believe the crime can be
most thoroughly investigated where the evidence exists).
129 See, e.g., id. (noting that common law countries believe that the evidence can be most easily and
inexpensively obtained in the country where the crime was committed).
130 BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 314. This principle, called the territorial principle, is the most
common basis for exercising jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, cmt. c. For a discussion of this
theory ofjurisdiction, see BASStOUNi, supra note 52, at 316-66.
131 RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, cmt. c; BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 316.
132 Territoriality is considered the normal method for exercising jurisdiction, while nationality is
generally ai exceptional basis for jurisdiction. RESTATEMrNT, supra note 107, crnt. b. The United States
does not generally rely on the active personality/nationality theory of jurisdiction. BASSIOUNI, supra note
52, at 367.
133 RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 402(2); BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 315. For a discussion of
the active personality/nationality theory ofjurisdiction, see BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 366-69.
134 Other than the principles of territorial jurisdiction and active personality/nationality jurisdiction
listed in this section, the principles of protective jurisdiction and passive personality jurisdiction also can
weigh in favor of home prosecution in these types of scenarios-see discussion in Part III.D.
.3 See Lockerbie discussion, infra Part VL.A; see also Steven W. Krohne, Comment, The United
States and the World Need an International Criminal Court as an Ally in the War Against Terrorism, 8
IND. INT'lt & COMP. L. REV. 159, 180 (1997) (discussing Colombia's inability to try drug suspects in its
own courts "due to risks of adverse political consequences or violent repercussions at home"); Molly
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V. ABDUCTION AND SEIZURE
If extradition or home state prosecution are not viable options,
requesting states may resort to either abduction or seizure as a method for
rendering the suspect to them. The United States has resorted to these
methods before, so it is possible that they could be used in the Abu Sayyaf
situation. It is also possible that Australia could resort to these methods in
addressing the Bali bombing. Since abduction and seizure violate
international norms, they should be used sparingly, when all other options
have been exhausted.
A. Abduction and Seizure Defined
When undertaken to obtain jurisdiction, abduction is done by agents
of one state acting under a state's authority who unlawfully seize a person
from another state and deliver that person to the state in which he is
sought. 136  Abduction is carried out because the physical presence of a
suspect in a court is enough to establish jurisdiction. 37 Abduction can only
occur when the state from which the individual is seized is not involved in
the seizure. 1
3 8
Seizure and subsequent rendition is another option. This occurs when
officials of the state where the individual is found act with the help of agents
of another state outside the legal process to deliver the individual to the state
in which he is sought.
1 39
B. Abduction and Seizure Is Possible in the Abu Sayyaf Situation
The United States has a history of using abduction and seizure as
methods for obtaining jurisdiction over suspects not in its territory, and
courts have often upheld these methods. In an 1886 case involving the
abduction of an individual wanted in the United States from Peru, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that "forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why
Moore & Douglas Farah, Prisoners of the Drug War; U.S. Desire to Extradite Brothers Tests Relations
With Mexico, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at A20, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World
Publications File (stating that Mexico's attempts to try drug traffickers, rather than extraditing them, have
been thwarted by corruption in the country's legal system).
136 BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 252.
' Id. at 253-54.
... Id. at 256.
"9 Id. at 256-57.
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the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court
which has the right to try him for such an offence."'
' 40
The United States has been involved in an abduction of a person from
another state. In 1990, individuals hired by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") kidnapped a Mexican national from his home and brought
him to the United States, where he was then arrested and prosecuted.'14 The
Mexican citizen, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, was suspected of being
involved in the murder of an undercover DEA agent in Mexico. 14 z Alvarez-
Machain appealed on grounds of due process and violation of the United
States-Mexico extradition treaty.143 The case finally came before to the U.S.
Supreme Court for review.' 44  The Court examined the United States-
Mexico treaty literally, but found no language prohibiting either country
from abducting individuals from the other's territory,14 5 and therefore held
that the treaty did not bar prosecution in this case. This case would seem to
make abduction a viable option for the United States, should extradition of
the Abu Sayyaf suspects prove difficult, because there is nothing specifically
in the United States-Philippines Treaty that appears to bar abduction.
U.S. courts have also upheld seizure as a valid means of obtaining
jurisdiction. Relying on the principle stated in Ker, the Second Circuit
upheld the conviction of a man who claimed he had been abducted from
Mexico and sent to the United States by Mexican police acting as agents of
the United States.' 46 This case would seem to make seizure a possible way
for the United States to obtain jurisdiction, if extradition of the Abu Sayyaf
nationals via the United States-Philippines Extradition Treaty could not be
realized.
C. Abduction and Seizure Is Possible in the Bali Bombing Situation
Abduction or seizure might be options for Australia as well, although
there has been no Australian case law upholding jurisdiction obtained
through abduction. However, Australian Prime Minister John Howard said
in December 2002 that he would be willing to launch a pre-emptive strike
140 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
141 See, e.g., William Branigin, Kidnapping of Doctor Riles Mexico; Thornburgh, on Visit, Will Face
Questions, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1990, at A29, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World
Publications File.
42 See, e.g., id.
43 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601, 606 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
144 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
141 Id. at 663.
146 United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 524-25 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873, reh 'g
denied, 355 U.S. 920 (1958).
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against terrorists in another country who were preparing to attack
Australians.147 Although this is not necessarily akin to using abduction or
seizure as methods to obtain jurisdiction over suspects, it does demonstrate a
willingness to step outside the bounds of international norms in order to
achieve the goals of the state. 48 It remains to be seen whether an Australian
court would uphold the use of these methods to obtain jurisdiction, but the
statement may be an indication of a change in the philosophy of Australia's
government.
4 9
D. Advantages of Abduction and Seizure and Factors Pointing to
Abduction or Seizure as the Best Option
Although an advantage of using abduction or seizure in a situation
similar to the Abu Sayyaf and Bali situations would be obtaining personal
jurisdiction, there are many policy reasons weighing against these options.
One commentator has noted -that "[s]elf-help endangers lives and violates the
sovereignty of independent nations, thereby increasing international
tensions. Thus, while self-help may bring criminals to justice, it does so at
considerable cost to international comity." 50 Another scholar has stated that
abduction, specifically, involves disruption of public order, infringement on
the sovereignty of another state, and violation of the rights of the person
seized.15' If nations resort to abduction or seizure rather than going through
147 Mark Metherell & Cosima Marriner, PM's Invasion Threat Angers Asia, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Dec. 2, 2002, at 2, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
148 Many have remarked that pre-emptive strikes are a violation of international law. See, e.g.,
Firdaus Abdullah, Dr M Blasts Howard (HL), NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia), Dec. 3, 2002, at 1,
available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File (listing Asian leaders who stated
that pre-emptive strikes violated international law, as well as a statement by Howard that the U.N. Charter
and international laws should be changed to allow for pre-emptive strikes).
1'9 Another example that could be indicative of a change is the Tampa incident, wherein Australia
detained and then relocated to other countries hundreds of primarily Afghan refugees who were seeking to
enter its borders. Some have stated that these actions were in violation of international law. See, e.g.,
Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, No Safe Refuge: The Impact of the September I I Attacks on Refugees,
Asylum Seekers and Migrants in the Afghanistan Region and World Wide, Oct. 18, 2001, at 11,
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/refugees/refugee-bckl017.pdf; Alexander J. Wood, The "Pacific
Solution ": Refugees Unwelcome in Australia, 9 HUM. RTS. BR. 22, 25 (2002); Irene Khan, Trading in
Human Misery: A Human Rights Perspective on the Tampa Incident, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 9, 18
(2003). For more information on the Tampa incident, see Symposium: Australia's Tampa Incident: The
Convergence of International and Domestic Refugee and Maritime Law in the Pacific Rim, 12 PAC. RIM L.
& POL'Y J. vii-177 (2003).
So Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century, 13. CONN.
J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1998).
i'I BASSIOUNI, supra note 52, at 252. Abduction also violates customary human rights norms. See,
e.g., John Quigley, Our Men in Guadalajara and the Abduction of Suspects Abroad: A Comment on United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723, 745 (1993) (stating that "[a]bduction violates
freedoms protected under the conventional and customary law of human rights").
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formal extradition proceedings, this will likely reduce confidence in
extradition treaties and could damage international relationships.,
52
However, abduction and seizure may be effective alternatives if the
state in which the suspects are found refuses to extradite the individuals in
accordance with an extradition treaty, and either will not prosecute the
suspects or will not do so effectively. Since abduction violates customary
human rights law,' 53 it should be used sparingly, if at all. Therefore, one
factor that may point to the use of abduction or seizure is whether the
requesting state has exhausted all of its other options with respect to making
sure the suspect is tried satisfactorily.
VI. INTERVENTION OR TRIAL BY AN INDEPENDENT BODY
If a requested state does not cooperate with the terms of an extradition
treaty, or a requesting state is otherwise unhappy with a situation in which it
is trying to obtain jurisdiction over a terrorist suspect, the requesting state
could ask that the UN compel extradition or the handing over of the suspect
to some type of international court with sanctions. The seriousness of the
crime and whether other options have failed are factors to examine in
determining whether UN sanctions are appropriate. Two states involved in a
dispute over the terms of an extradition treaty could bring the dispute to the
ICJ for resolution. Whether the situation involves treaty interpretation and
the willingness of the two states to cooperate are factors to determine
whether the ICJ is a viable option. Finally, once the ICC is fully
functioning, it can also operate as an option for state parties. The nature of
the crime, the willingness and ability of the home state to prosecute the
suspects, and the party status of the home state are factors to consider in
determining whether the ICC is appropriate.
A. United Nations Sanctions
The UN Charter addresses sanctions, stating that the Security Council:
152 In their amicus curiae briefs for Alvarez-Machain, both Mexico and Canada stated that the case
could cause problems in international relations. Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Affirmance, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 91-712) (intimating
that the U.S.-Mexico cooperation on the prevention of drug trafficking could be affected); Brief of the
Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 91-712) (stating that the case could have a strong effect on the U.S.-Canada
relationship).
153 Quigley, supra note 151, at 745.
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may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations. 5 4
Sanctions typically take an economic form, preventing the state on which
they are imposed from buying or selling goods globally. 1
55
First, it is important to note that UN sanctions are not a method of
prosecution themselves, but rather a means of coercion; a requesting state
may use them to ensure that an uncooperative home state turn suspects over
to it, another state, or an independent court such as an ad-hoc tribunal or the
ICC. The UN response to the government of Libya's refusal to extradite two
Libyan intelligence officers suspected of involvement in the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 is an example of such a
situation. No extradition treaty existed between Libya and the United States
or Libya and the United Kingdom, 156 and Libya refused to hand over the two
suspects, stating that they would not receive a fair trial in either the United
States or the United Kingdom. 57 Libya instead wanted to try the suspects
itself.158 In response, the UN Security Council issued two resolutions: one
urging the Libyan government to cooperate with the investigation, 59 and
one imposing economic sanctions if the Libyan government failed to
comply.' 60 This was the first time that the Security Council had demanded
extradition of nationals of a requested state to stand trial in another state.1
61
Libya refused, the sanctions were imposed, and in 1999, after years of
... U.N. CHARTER art. 41, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm (last visited
Apr. 29, 2003).
"' James A. Paul & Senwan Akhtar, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Sanctions: An Analysis, Aug. 1998,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/anlysis2.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
156 Arzt, supra note 51, at 166.
157 Thomas W. Lippman, U.S., Britain Announce Plans for Pan-Am Trial; Libya Challenged to
Deliver Bomb Suspects, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1998, at A01, available at LEXIS, News and Business,
Major World Publications File.
1s8 Arzt, supra note 51, at 175.
'59 S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 3033rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/23574 (1992), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm.
'60 S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm.
161 Paul Lewis, Libya Unyielding Despite U.N. Demand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at A8, available
at LEXIS, News and Business, News, Major World Publications.
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negotiations, the Libyan government finally turned over the two suspects to
Scottish authorities in the Netherlands.'
62
UN sanctions seem an unlikely option in the Philippine or Indonesian
situations. If the Philippine government captured but refused to extradite the
Abu Sayyaf suspects, the United States could lobby the UN to impose
sanctions on the Philippines. This seems improbable, given the historically
close and favorable relationship between the United States and the
Philippines. 63 Similarly, the Australian government could lobby the UN to
compel Indonesia to extradite the Bali bombing suspects by imposing
sanctions.164  Australia has taken no steps in this direction, and since
Indonesia has already begun prosecuting the suspects, it appears that UN
sanctions will not be used.
Since the length of time that it could potentially take to resolve an
issue is a major drawback to using UN sanctions, 165 one factor to be
considered when assessing whether to use this option is the seriousness of
the terrorist attack at issue. A state would likely need to have a very high
interest in a suspect to make such a potentially lengthy wait worthwhile. In
addition, if the sanctions were not harsh enough, the country might be able
to weather them and the suspects would not be turned over. Because of the
unpredictability of the effect of sanctions, they would only be the best option
in cases involving more serious crimes, where the UN was motivated to act
quickly and forcefully, and where other alternatives had failed. 1
66
B. The International Court of Justice
Like UN sanctions, the ICJ also presents a solution to extradition
disputes. One of the ICJ's roles is "to settle in accordance with international
162 Anne Swardson, Lockerbie Suspects Delivered for Trial, Sanctions on Libya Suspended by U.N.,
WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1999, at AO 1, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications
File.
"'See, e.g., M. Victoria Bayoneto, Note, The Former US. Bases in the Philippines: An Argument for
the Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to Overseas Military Bases, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. I11,
116(1994).
64 Unlike the relationship between the United States and the Philippines, there is evidence that the
relationship between Indonesia and Australia is problematic. See, e.g., War Complicates an Uneasy
Relationship, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Mar. 15, 2003, at 48, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major
World Publications File.
"' In the Lockerbie situation, the sanctions were imposed for seven years before Colonel Qadhafi
handed over the suspects. See, e.g., Arzt, supra note 51, at 165.
166 The fact that the Lockerbie incident was the only situation in which the Security Council
demanded extradition of vationals to stand trial in another state points to the extreme circumstances
required of the situation.
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law the legal disputes submitted to it by States." 67 The ICJ is composed of
fifteen judges of different nationalities, elected by the UN General Assembly
and the Security Council. 168 Only UN member states can appear before the
ICJ as parties, and one or both of the states must have agreed to submit the
dispute to the ICJ, or be submitting the dispute by virtue of a provision
agreed upon by them in a treaty. 69 To decide the cases that come before it,
the ICJ considers international conventions, international custom, general
principles of law, and teachings of qualified publicists. 70  Since the ICJ
cannot try a terrorist suspect itself,'7' its role in a situation similar to the Abu
Sayyaf or Bali situations would likely be to decide an extradition treaty
dispute.1
72
Although neither the United States-Philippines Treaty nor the
Indonesia-Australia Treaty has a provision for resolution of any disputes by
the ICJ, it is possible that any of the countries could submit an extradition
dispute to the ICJ. 173 Australia has taken no steps towards submission of the
issue to the ICJ, and since Indonesia has already begun to prosecute some of
the Bali bombing suspects, it seems unlikely that the ICJ would be used
here. 174
The ICJ, however, is a good alternative when a bilateral extradition
treaty or a relevant multilateral treaty lists the ICJ as an arbiter in the case of
a dispute. This option is best if the two countries involved are cooperative,
since both parties must voluntarily submit the case to the ICJ. 175 Many of
the ICJ's cases involve interpretation of treaties, 176 so a situation that
167 International Court of Justice, General Information-The Court at a Glance, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.htm (Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter ICJ General Information].
' Statute of the International Court of Justice, ch. I, arts. 3-4 (1945), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictextibasicstatute.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003) [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
6' Id. ch. I, arts. 36-37.
170 Id. ch. II, art. 38(1).
:71 Only states can be parties before the ICJ. Id. ch. II, art. 34(1).
72 The ICJ has jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning treaty interpretation, international law, and
international obligations. Id. ch. I, art. 36(2).
173 Article 16(1) of the Hostages Treaty, supra note 70, allows for one state to refer a dispute under
the treaty to the ICJ if arbitration cannot be agreed upon within six months. Otherwise, both the United
States and the Philippines would have to submit to the ICJ's jurisdiction if an extradition request were
outside of the Hostages Treaty. International Court of Justice, Basis of the Court's Jurisdiction,
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasic-basisjurisdiction.htmnl (last visited Apr.
29, 2003).
174 In addition, Indonesia is not a party to the Terrorist Bombing Treaty, so art. 20(1) of that treaty,
addressing ICJ jurisdiction, is not applicable.
175 ICJ General Information, supra note 167.
176 Many of the cases currently pending in the ICJ concern treaty interpretation. See, e.g., Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings (Nov. 2, 1992), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopframe.htm (last visitcd Apr. 29, 2003) (involving the interpretation of a
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involves strict interpretation of an extradition treaty or other relevant treaty
would be a better option for the ICJ. In addition, the length of time between
an application by a country and a decision by the ICJ is usually
significant,177 making the ICJ a better option if time is not an issue.
C. The International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute of the ICC was promulgated on July 17, 1998, and
entered into force on July 1, 2002. 17 The ICC has yet to become
operational, as judges179 and the prosecutor' 80 have only recently been
elected.' 8  Based solely on the fact that the ICC is not currently operational,
the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah cases will likely not be heard by the
ICC.182 However, even when the ICC becomes operational, neither the Abu
Sayyaf and Bali attacks could come under ICC jurisdiction unless the
Philippines or Indonesia became a party to the statute.'83
treaty between Iran and the United States); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), Application Instituting
Proceedings (Mar. 20, 1993), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyframe.htm (last visited Apr.
29, 2003) (involving the interpretation of the Genocide Convention); Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicar. v. Colom.), Application of the Republic of Nicaragua (Dec. 6, 2001), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/inicol/inicolorder/inicol iapplication_20011206.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2003)
(involving interpretation of a multilateral treaty to which both states are parties).
177 For example, the Oil Platforms case was instituted in 1992 and is only just now being heard by the
ICJ. See International Court of Justice, Current Docket of the Court, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
78 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF. 183/9, July 17, 1998, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
179 The judges were elected in early February 2003. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Nominations for judges of the International Criminal Court, at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/elections/results/judges_results.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2003).
"0 The Prosecutor of the ICC was elected on April 21, 2003. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Nominations for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/elections/prosecutor/prosecutornoninations.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
1SI See supra notes 179 and 180.
82 It is also possible that the cases could be heard by an ad hoc tribunal, such as those that were set
up for trying crimes associated with the conflicts in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia. However, this
is very unlikely, as one of the main purposes of both of these tribunals was to restore peace to a war-torn
region through justice and the promotion of reconciliation. See The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, The ICTY At A Glance-General Information, at
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (updated Apr. 8, 2003); The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, About the Tribunal-General Information-Introduction, at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/default.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003). This is not an aspect of the situation
in either the Philippines or Indonesia.
183 The Philippines has signed the statute, and ratification has been approved by the Department of
Foreign Affairs and now must go through the President and the Senate. Coalition for the International
Criminal Court, Country Information: Philippines, at
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/asia/philippines.htn- (last updated Apr. 29, 2003). Indonesia has
neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Country
Information: Indonesia, at http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/asia/indonesia.htr (last updated Sept. 30,
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There are several requirements that must be met in order for a case to
be heard by the ICC. First, the state where the crime occurred or whose
national allegedly committed the crime must be a party to the statute. 184 In
addition, the ICC only has jurisdiction over certain types of crimes, one of
which is crimes against humanity.1 85  This includes murder "when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."' 186 In order for murders
or other crimes to fall under ICC jurisdiction, they need to be widespread or
systematic-isolated incidents are not likely to suffice. The crimes would
also have to be directed towards a specific population, so crimes that appear
to be mainly driven by opportunity or money do not rise to that level.
In addition, the Rome Statute states that a case is inadmissible where
"[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry
out the investigation or the prosecution.' '187 The Rome Statute also deems a
case inadmissible when a state with jurisdiction over it has investigated and
decided not to prosecute the individual in question, unless that decision
reflected an inability or unwillingness to prosecute.188 However, the Rome
Statute also allows a non-party state where the attack occurred, or where the
alleged perpetrator is a national, to accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the
ICC with respect to the crime in question.' 
89
There are many arguments that commentators have posited both for
and against the use of the ICC, and many of these arguments apply to the use
of the ICC in situations similar to the two attacks focused on in this
Comment. One major advantage is that the ICC is a neutral forum with
uniform laws, reducing the concern of the requested state that the individual
would not be tried fairly in the requesting state. 190 This is an advantage in
situations where the laws or the judicial system in either the home country or
the victims' country are questionable. The ICC could also greatly reduce the
2002). Australia is currently a party to the statute. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Country
Information: Australia, at http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/oceania!australia.html (last updated Sept. 30,
2002). The United States signed the statute, but has since declared it does not intend to ratify it. Coalition
for the International Criminal Court, Country Information: United States ofAmerica, at
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/theamericas/unitedstates.htmil (last updated Oct. 14, 2002).
"' Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pt. 2, art. 12(2), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998,
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
.. Id. art. 7.
:86 Id. art. 7(i).
7 Id. art. 17(l)(a).
:s8 Id. art. 17(l)(b).
s Id. art. 12(3).
'go Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal
Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 97 (1995).
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incidence of abduction and seizure as methods of obtaining jurisdiction,
operating to "ease tensions and inefficiencies caused by the aggressive
unilateral pursuit of foreign suspects by providing an established,
internationally legitimate forum for cooperation and action."' 9' In situations
where the tension between the two countries involved is high, this approach
can be particularly helpful. One commentator has argued that the ICC's
establishment of uniform laws and deterrent effect on abductions would act
to safeguard individual human rights, 192 which is important when suspects
are alleged to have been tortured or otherwise treated inhumanely.
Naturally, there are characteristics of the ICC that make its application
to future situations like the two being examined here problematic. In
particular, some have argued that states that do not extradite particular
individuals under existing laws are not likely to extradite them to the ICC.
19 3
This is a valid concern, particularly with respect to countries like Indonesia,
who do not extradite their own nationals,' 94 and it is unlikely that a state
with such a restriction would consent to ICC jurisdiction, even if it did ratify
the Rome Statute. If a state has not ratified the statute, however, it has no
obligation to submit the case to review by the ICC, 195 so the advantages of
the ICC would be irrelevant.
Whether or not a case similar to the Abu Sayyaf and Bali situations
can be tried by the ICC will, as a threshold matter, generally depend on
whether the home state is a party to the statute. There are also two other
main factors that inform this decision. The first is whether the attack can be
characterized as a crime against humanity, as defined in the Rome Statute.
The statute requires that a crime fall under this or one of its other categories
in order to exercise jurisdiction.' 96 Second, since the ICC is complementary
to state jurisdiction, 197 the home state must either be unwilling to prosecute
the crime, or that state's judicial system must be weak or corrupt enough to
consider the home state unable to effectively prosecute the crime.
' ' Id. at 141-42.
192 Kai I. Rebane, Note, Extradition and Individual Rights: The Need for an International Criminal
Court to Safeguard Individual Rights, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1636, 1683 (1996).
'9' Report of the Task Force on an International Criminal Court of the American Bar Association,
1994 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAc. 46.
'94 Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 1, art. 7(1)-(2) (1979) (Indon.), cited in Australian Bills
Digest, supra note 41.
'" Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pt. 2, art. 12(2), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998,
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
:96 Id. pt. 2, art. 7.
"97 Id. art. 17(1)(a).
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VII. THE TEST FOR DECIDING THE BEST METHOD OF PROSECUTION
To create a useful formula for analyzing what should be done for the
prosecution of future terrorist attacks like Abu Sayyaf and Bali, an analysis
of the application of relevant factors is necessary. These factors have been
explored throughout the body of this Comment and will be combined to
create a series of steps to determine how terrorist suspects in future
situations should be prosecuted.
A. Extradition and Home Prosecution Balancing Test
1. First Step: Deciding Between Home Prosecution or Extradition and
an Alternate Method
The first set of factors to analyze indicate whether a suspect should be
tried through home prosecution or extradition, or through some alternative
method. The first factor is whether the home state has a strong, independent,
and trustworthy judicial system. The second factor is whether the actual or
potential global interest in the crime is high. Neither one of these factors is
dispositive, but together they constitute a balancing test. If the home state's
judicial system falls more on the side of being strong and independent, and
the crime falls less on the side of being of international importance, then the
suspect should either be tried through home prosecution or extradition. If
the home state's legal system is less satisfactory and the crime is of greater
interest to the global community, then the suspect should be tried through an
alternative method.
2. Second Step: Deciding Between Extradition and Home Prosecution
If the balancing test indicates that a suspect should be tried through
either home prosecution or extradition, a second set of factors determine
which choice should be made. The first factor is whether there is a positive
relationship between the countries involved. This factor requires one to
determine whether the requesting state trusts the government and methods of
the home state. 198 The second factor is whether the requesting state has a
prosecution interest superior to the interest of the home state. This may be
the case if many individuals from the requesting state were killed or injured,
198 If the requesting state trusts the methods and judicial system of the home state, it will likely feel
more comfortable with allowing the home state to prosecute a suspect it has an interest in as well.
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but no individuals from the home state were hurt. 199 These two factors
comprise the home prosecution and extradition balancing test. If the
relationship between the countries is good and the requesting state's interest
is not superior to the home state, then home prosecution is the preferred
method. If the relationship between the countries is problematic and the
requesting state's interest is very high, then extradition is preferred.
It is also important to note how treaties play into this part of the
analysis. If a bilateral extradition treaty allows for the refusal of extradition
of nationals, and the home state's laws prohibit it, then it will not matter how
much distrust there is of the home state's judiciary or how high the home
state's interest is in prosecution-the suspect will be tried in his home
200state. However, in situations where extradition of nationals is
discretionary, this sort of analysis may be helpful in determining whether
extradition should occur. In addition, if either state disputes how the other is
applying the terms of the relevant bilateral or multilateral treaty, the ICJ is
an option for the resolution of that dispute.
201
B. Alternate Means of Prosecution
If the first balancing test indicates that the home state's judicial
system is weak and there is high global interest in the crime, the suspect
should then be tried through alternate means. At this point in the analysis,
another balancing test of two factors is helpful. The first factor is whether
the terrorist attack at issue can be considered a crime against humanity, as
articulated in the Rome Statute. 202 The second factor is whether the home
state's legal and police system is weak or corrupt enough to consider the
home state unable to prosecute such a crime, as defined under the Rome
Statute.20 3 If the attack can be considered a crime against humanity and the
judicial system of the home state is very weak, then the ICC should exercise
jurisdiction. If the attack cannot be defined in that way, and the home state's
judiciary is strong enough to effectively try the case, the requesting state
199 This would give the victims' state exclusive passive personality jurisdiction, strengthening its
interest in the suspect. See discussion supra note 107.
2'0 Indonesia is one example of a country that has laws prohibiting extradition of nationals, and where
suspects are therefore being tried in their home state.
201 The ICJ has jurisdiction over disputes concerning treaty interpretation, international law, and
international obligations. ICJ Statute, supra note 168, ch. I, art. 36(2).
202 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pt. 2, art. 7(1), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998,
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htmn (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
203 ld. art. 17(l)(a).
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should accept the jurisdiction of the home state and allow that state to handle
the case as it wishes.
Again, if the home state is not actually a party to the ICC, then it is
not required to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICC,20 4 no matter how
egregious the crime or how ineffectual the judiciary. In this situation, the
requesting state has two options. The requesting state can first attempt to
lobby the UN to use sanctions to coerce the home state into submitting the
suspect to ICC jurisdiction.2 °5  If this is not effective, the requesting state
must then determine how important it is that the suspect be tried
satisfactorily. If the state decides that it cannot accept the situation, then it
may be justified in using either abduction or seizure as an option for gaining
jurisdiction over the suspect. Since this is a violation of international
norms, 206 a state should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of thisoption carefully.
VIII. THE TEST ILLUSTRATED
Application of the test to the Abu Sayyaf and Bali situations shows
that home prosecution is the best option for attacks similar to the Abu
Sayyaf attacks, while prosecution in the ICC is preferable for attacks similar
to the Bali bombing.
A. The Test Applied to the Abu Sayyaf Situation
In the Abu Sayyaf situation, and in future situations with similar fact
patterns, the test indicates that home prosecution is the preferable option.
An application of the first balancing test shows that while the Philippine
207judicial system has some problems, the system is relatively strong overall.
In addition, the fact that Abu Sayyaf targets mainly Filipinos, 2°8 and that
foreign victims appear to be chosen only for their ransom potential, 20 9 results
204 The court may exercise its powers over the territory of any state party, but can only exercise
powers over the territory of a non-party state by special agreement. Id. pt. 1, art. 4(2).205 Sanctions similar to those imposed on Libya in the Lockerbie situation could be used. See
discussion supra Part VI.A.
206 Quigley, supra note 151, at 745.
207 See FREEDOM HOUSE-PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 112.
208 For example, seventeen Filipinos were kidnapped along with the three Americans in May 2001.
See Jess Liwanag, Philippines Arrest al-Qaeda-Linked Bomber, CNN ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/I 1/14/phil.bomb.suspect/index.html.
209 The U.S. State Department has noted that Abu Sayyaf seems to be using terrorism mainly for
financial gain. See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 88.
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in limited international interest in the crime. Therefore, the suspects should
either be tried through home prosecution or extradition.
The second balancing test points to home prosecution in the Abu
Sayyaf situation. Examination of the first factor reveals that the United
States and the Philippines have a historically close relationship, 210 and that
the United States considers the Philippines a partner in the war on terror.2'1
While it is unclear how confident the United States is that the Philippine
judicial system can adequately try Abu Sayyaf suspects, the United States is
cooperating with the Philippine government in the pursuit of the guerillas,2
12
which indicates some amount of faith in the Philippine system. 2 3  In
addition, the Philippine interest in prosecuting the Abu Sayyaf suspects is
high, as the majority of Abu Sayyafs victims have been Filipino.214 The
result of the second balancing test indicates that even though extradition to
the United States may be possible under the treaty,215 home prosecution is
the best method.
B. The Test Applied to the Bali Bombing Situation
In the Bali bombing situation, home prosecution is already occurring
216
and it appears that the suspects will be tried in Indonesia. However, an
application of the test to the Bali situation shows that for Bali, and in future
situations with similar fact patterns, the suspects should be tried by the ICC.
The first balancing test illustrates serious problems with the Indonesian
21judiciary, 17 as well as problems regarding trial delays and the treatment of
the Bali suspects.2 18 There is also a high level of international interest in the
crime, due to the number of individuals killed, the different nationalities of
the victims, and the apparent intent of Jemaah Islamiyah to specifically
210 See, e.g., Bayoneto, supra note 163, at 116.
211 See, e.g., Andrei, supra note 114.
212 See Karen L. Lema & Hannah Ira V. Alcoseba, Sulu Just One of Sites for RP-US War Games
(Balikatan 03-1 to Cover Several Venues in Western Mindanao), BUSINESSWORLD, April 10, 2003, at 12,
available at LEXIS, News and Business, Major World Publications File.
213 The U.S. State Department has also recognized the Philippine judiciary as independent.
PHILIPPINES HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 112.
214 See, e.g., Liwanag, supra note 208.
2 5 The U.S.-Philippines Treaty allows for the extradition of nationals. U.S.-Philippines Treaty, supra
note 71, art. 6.
216 Bali Trials Could Begin in April, CNN ONLINE, Mar. 7, 2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/03/07/bali.trial.reut/index.htn-A [hereinafter Bali
Trials Could Begin in April].
217 See discussion on the corruption in the Indonesian judiciary, supra note 117.
218 Goodsir, supra note 127.
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target westerners for religious and political reasons.219  Therefore, the
suspects should be tried by an alternate method.
The next balancing test shows that the ICC is the best option for
trying .the Bali suspects. The crime can be considered a crime against
humanity, 220 due to the large number of people killed and the intent to target
a specific group of people-westerners and those with western interests and
beliefs.22' In addition, the problems with Indonesia's judicial system are
such that it can be considered unable to effectively prosecute the Bali
bombers itself.22 2 Therefore, the ICC is the preferred method of prosecution.
Although Indonesia will likely go ahead with the prosecutions,223 in future,
similar situations party states should submit those cases to the ICC. UN
pressure or sanctions may make uncooperative or nonparty states submit to
ICC jurisdiction.224
One commentator has noted, with respect to national courts, that
"[t]rials of international crimes . .. may challenge even the most advanced
legal systems. No judicial system, even one that prides itself on assuring the
fullest respect for human rights, is immune from human biases and
prejudices., 225  The ICC may solve this problem, as it is intended to be a
venue for the resolution of serious crimes that affect and are of interest to the
entire globe. Although the Bali bombing suspects will not be tried by the
ICC,22 the court exists for that purpose, and there should be an attempt to
bring suspects of future, similar attacks under the scope of the ICC.
IX. CONCLUSION
Because of the intricate analysis required to determine whether
extradition, home prosecution, or an alternate method is best for trying
individuals suspected of committing attacks similar to the Abu Sayyaf
219 See discussion of Jemaah lslamiyah's intent to attack westerners, supra note 50.
220 Crimes against humanity are defined in the Rome Statute. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, pt. 2, art. 7(1), A/CONF. 183/9, July 17, 1998, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).221 One of the suspects stated that the purpose of the bombing was to attack America and its allies.
See, e.g., Bali Bomb Suspect Apologizes, supra note 49.222 See discussion on the corruption in the Indonesian judiciary, supra note 117. The problems with
respect to the East Timor prosecutions also indicate problems with the ability of the Indonesian legal
system to effectively try cases. See supra Part IV.C.
21 Bali Trials Could Begin in April, supra note 216.224 Sanctions similar to those imposed on Libya in the Lockerbie situation could be used. See
discussion supra Part VI.A.225 MacPherson, supra note 150, at 18.
226 Indonesia is not a party to the ICC. See discussion supra note 183. In addition, the Bali trials are
already slated to begin in Indonesia in May 2003. See Miller, supra note 44.
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kidnappings and the Bali bombing, a bright line rule is not appropriate.
However, an examination of the enumerated factors creates a series of
balancing tests that are useful analytic tools for determining when actions
should be taken: strength of the home state's judiciary and police force,
global interest in the crime, relationship between the states involved, interest
of the requesting state, and the nature of the crime. Examining the Abu
Sayyaf and Bali bombing situations illustrates that home prosecution is
preferable for situations similar to the Abu Sayyaf case, where there is low
global interest in the crime, the relationship between the countries involved
is strong, the requesting state's interest is relatively low, and the home
state's judiciary is independent. The examination shows that the ICC is
ideal for situations similar to the Bali bombing situation, where there is high
global interest in the crime, the relationship between the countries involved
is tenuous, the home state's judiciary is weak, and the crime can be defined
as a crime against humanity.

